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3.1. Introduction 
Ernest Nagel is a crucial figure in the history of analytic philosophy. He played a key role in 
introducing logical empiricism to the American philosophical community but also remained 
faithful to the naturalism of his teachers at Columbia University and the City College of New 
York. In thus mediating between American and European schools of thought, Nagel paved 
the way for an approach that still pervades academic philosophy today. Not only was he one 
of the most prominent post-war philosophers of science, his contributions attempt to 
 
 An early version of this paper was presented at the conference “Ernest Nagel and the Making of Philosophy of 
Science” at the BTK Institute of Philosophy, Budapest. I would like to thank the audience at this event as well 
as Fons Dewulf, Matthias Neuber, and Ádám Tamás Tuboly for the valuable suggestions. This research is 
funded by Dutch Research Council (grant 275–20–064). Correspondence concerning this paper should be 
addressed to Tilburg University, Department of Philosophy, Warandelaan 2, 5037AB, Tilburg, The Netherlands 
or to A.A.verhaegh@tilburguniversity.edu. 
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reconcile the empiricists’ focus on “limited and determinate problems” (Nagel 1954/1956, 5) 
with the naturalists’ comprehensive perspective on man, mind, and morality.  
 This paper aims to shed new light on Nagel’s intermediating endeavors by 
reconstructing his philosophical development in the late 1920s and 1930s. This is a decisive 
period in Nagel’s career because it is the phase in which he first formulated the principles of 
his naturalism (Nagel 1931a; 1935/1956) and spent a year in Europe to visit the key centers 
of logical empiricism. Building on a range of published and unpublished papers, notes, and 
correspondence, I reconstruct Nagel’s philosophical development, focusing especially on the 
philosophical influence of John Dewey, Morris R. Cohen, Rudolf Carnap, and Hans 
Reichenbach.1 
 This paper is structured as follows. The first part provides an overview of Nagel’s 
work in the years before he visited Europe. After an analysis of Nagel’s naturalism in the 
early 1930s (Sections 3.2-3), I reconstruct the philosophical influence of Dewey and Cohen, 
Nagel’s most prominent “intellectual mentors” (Sections 3.4-5).2 In the second part of this 
paper, I examine Nagel’s first encounters with logical empiricism. I reconstruct his year in 
Europe and examine his changing perspective on the views of Carnap, Reichenbach, and the 
Cambridge school of analysis (Sections 3.6-8). I end the paper with an overview of Nagel’s 
contributions to the American reception of logical empiricism (Section 3.9) and I reconstruct 
his attempts to unite his naturalistic Weltanschauung with the empiricists’ piecemeal 
approach (Section 3.10). 
 
3.2. Nagel’s Naturalism 
Nagel was a dedicated naturalist from the start of his academic career. In his dissertation, he 
describes his philosophy as naturalistic and characterizes it as a position about the nature and 
the limits of “reflective inquiry”. Although naturalists often disagree about the “generic 
traits” of reality, they are committed to a view about the way in which we acquire knowledge 
 
1 In addition to Nagel’s early publications, this paper is based on material from the Ernest Nagel Papers at 
Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library (hereafter, ENP), the Hans Reichenbach Papers at the 
Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh (hereafter HRP), the Otto Neurath Nachlass at the 
Wiener Kreis Archiv in Haarlem (ONN), the Rudolf Carnap Papers at Pittsburgh’s Archives of Scientific 
Philosophy (RCP), and, most importantly, the hundreds of pages of correspondence between Nagel and Sidney 
Hook (Box 22, Folders 8-9, Sidney Hook Papers, Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford University, 
hereafter SHP). Transcriptions are mine unless indicated otherwise. 
2 See Suppes (1994, 258-259). In focusing on Cohen and Dewey, I do not want to suggest that they were the 
only U.S. philosophers to influence Nagel’s development. A more complete account would also have discussed 
the influence of, for example, C. S. Peirce, F. J. E. Woodbridge, and George Santayana. For Nagel’s early views 
on Peirce, see Nagel (1933b). Nagel briefly discusses Santayana’s and Woodbridge’s influences in Remmel 
Nunn’s interview (this volume).  
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about the world. The “content of what is designated by ‘nature’” has changed significantly 
over the centuries but naturalists share the view that our everyday aposteriori methods, 
perfected in the sciences, have proven to be the only reliable way to find out what the world 
is like (Nagel 1931a, ii). More specifically, Nagel commits himself to a holistic picture of 
inquiry, arguing that we cannot fundamentally question our theory of the world all at once. 
We can only critically examine our beliefs in a piecemeal fashion because every inquiry 
presupposes “a large body of knowledge, which in that inquiry must remain unquestioned” 
(original emphasis). For Nagel, inquiry is impossible unless it is framed in a wider realm of 
accredited knowledge: we can modify theories that have been taken for granted in previous 
investigations but these revisions can be made only “if other uniformities are used with some 
confidence” (1931a, 56-57). 
 Nagel’s naturalism has important consequences for his view about the goals and 
methods of philosophy. He provides a lucid characterization of his position in American 
Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, a volume that primarily aims to collect “philosophic self-
portraits” of the younger generation of American philosophers (Kallen and Hook 1935, v). In 
his contribution, Nagel argues that philosophy should be an attempt to understand the world 
of common experience. Our inquiries may reveal that our theories about the world require 
revision but philosophy can never show that our beliefs rest on an illusion: 
 
Reflection has at its ultimate point of departure the qualitatively diversified world of common 
experience. [...] It is this world which man tries to understand by unraveling some threads of its 
structure, thereby making it familiar to himself. [...] The world which philosophy tries to 
understand should [also] be the world as it is found; and since what is found includes the familiar 
things and practices of daily life, I am unable to regard any philosophy as honest or tenable which 
concludes them to be illusions or unreal. (Nagel 1935/1956, 39-40) 
 
The converse is also true: if philosophy cannot question the reality of our theory of the world 
all at once, we also cannot ground our knowledge by means of single “well-laid foundation”. 
Since no belief is sacrosanct, the road to truth is not a “marble stair” that provides security of 
position but a “treacherous, unblazed path where security of step is never guaranteed” (Nagel 
1929a, 171). Or, as Nagel (1935/1956, 40) put it in his intellectual self-portrait, philosophy 
cannot “legislate for the sciences”. 
 Contemporary discussions in metaphilosophy often distinguish between 
methodological and metaphysical naturalisms. Methodological naturalists emphasize the 
continuity of common sense, science, and philosophy and argue that our aposteriori methods 
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of inquiry are the only reliable road to knowledge. Metaphysical naturalists, on the other 
hand, defend a view about the nature of reality, arguing that there is no distinct supernatural 
world of Gods and spirits, no transcendental Absolute, and no Platonic realm of abstract 
forms. The world we encounter in our everyday lives and our laboratories is self-sufficient; it 
is governed by its own laws and does not depend on a supernatural realm.3 Prima facie, the 
two theses are independent. One could hold that the natural world is self-sufficient but 
believe that there are different methods to acquire knowledge about it; and, conversely, the 
view that our everyday aposteriori methods are the only reliable source of knowledge seems 
compatible with the presupposition that our everyday world depends on a supernatural realm 
of existence. For Nagel, however, metaphysical naturalism is a consequence of his 
methodological commitments. Due to the advances of science, we have a different view 
about the world we inhabit than we did a few hundred years ago. In consequence, our views 
about what constitutes the ‘natural’ are tied up with the advances of knowledge. It is 
impossible to spell out what it means to say that the natural world is self-sufficient without 
reference to our current best theories about nature, and hence to the methods we used in 
arriving at this picture of reality: 
  
[N]aturalism is [...] not simply a set of fixed doctrines about the system of events which constitute 
nature. [...] Indeed, the term ‘nature’ has meant many things in the history of thought, and 
professed naturalists have rarely agreed [...] as to what are the specific set of principles descriptive 
of the order of birth and decay of things. In spite of variations in the content of their views, 
however, they share a common method by which they support them. If there were a heaven 
inhabited and operated by disembodied spirits, I can fancy some of them claiming kinship with 
naturalism in so far as they [...] are at pains constantly to submit their principles to verification. 
(Nagel 1935/1956, 41) 
 
‘Nature’, in sum, is whatever we get to know by means of scientific method. To profess 
naturalism is to subscribe to a “method as well as [to] a metaphysics” (1931a, ii, emphasis 
added). Our views about the natural and supernatural would be empty if they would not be 
based on our current best theories about the world. 
 
3.3. The Logic of Inquiry 
Since Nagel characterizes naturalism as a view about the nature and limits of inquiry, it is 
perhaps not surprising that he spent much of his career analyzing key methodological tools 
 
3 See, for example, De Caro and Macarthur (2004), Papineau (2009), and Verhaegh (2018, Ch. 1). 
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and concepts. Most of his publications from the late 1920s and early 1930s are analyses of 
notions like convention (1929a), probability (Nagel 1933a), verification (Nagel 1934a), and 
scientific reduction (Nagel 1935a). The analysis of scientific method, Nagel maintained, is 
one of the central tasks of the naturalist: 
  
naturalism [...] is more certain of the general adequacy of its self-corrective method than it is of 
the unalterable finality of any particular conclusion. [...] And that is why I think the analysis and 
practice of scientific method is so essential to a thoroughgoing naturalism.4 (Nagel, 1935/1956, 
41-2) 
 
Even Nagel’s dissertation, which deals with “the logic of measurement”, is a case in point. 
The analysis of measurement, Nagel argues, is crucial because it is one of the essential tools 
by which we delimit and fixate “our ideas to things” (1935/1956, 17). Nagel’s dissertation 
develops what is nowadays called a representational theory, the view that measurement is the 
numerical representation of empirical relations between objects (Adams 1966). Whereas 
measurement was traditionally defined as the assessment of quantity and magnitude, Nagel 
argues that these concepts are theoretically superfluous. Building on the work of Bertrand 
Russell and Norman Campbell, the Cambridge philosophers who first developed an explicitly 
representational theory of measurement (Michell 1992), Nagel appeals to Occam’s razor in 
arguing that we can easily do without these concepts (Nagel 1931b, 325).5 
 In addition to analyzing central methodological concepts like measurement and 
probability, Nagel was also interested in the nature of logic itself. Several of his early 
publications (Nagel 1929bc; 1935/1956) deal with the question whether logic is about 
“words, thoughts, or objects” (Cohen and Nagel, Ch. 1). The problem, however, is that Nagel 
did not know how to square his naturalism with a satisfying philosophy of logic. He believed 
that anyone “who is committed to a whole-hearted naturalism” ought to accept that the 
validity of logic is ultimately grounded in reality (1929c, 708) but he also felt the 
“incompatibility between being an empiricist” and his view that logical laws can be certified 
“as being true on the basis of reflecti[on]” alone.6 He occasionally flirted with a (modal) 
realist account, arguing that “the norm or correctness of logic is based on the possibilities in 
 
4 In an unpublished radio lecture titled “The Philosophy of Science”, Nagel makes a similar point, arguing that it 
is the “prime concern of the philosopher” to analyze and understand “the logical and physical method” of the 
sciences (May 1932, ENP, Box 7).  
5 For a detailed analysis of Nagel’s theory of measurement, see Michell (2004, Ch. 5). 
6 Remmel Nunn’s interview with Nagel (this volume). See Pincock (2017) for a more detailed reconstruction of 
Nagel’s early views about logic. 
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the nature of things which are the objects of our discourse” (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 17-21) 
but also saw that this account was incompatible with his naturalistic commitments.7 
Ultimately, Nagel came to the conclusion that a naturalistic “analysis of both logic and 
mathematics [...] is still but a hope rather than an achievement” (Nagel 1935/1956, 50). His 
despair was short-lived, however, for he was about to find a naturalistically acceptable 
philosophy of logic on his 1934-35 trip to Europe.. 
 
3.4. Philosophical Influences (1): John Dewey  
It is not a coincidence that Nagel, from the very start of his career, described his worldview 
as ‘naturalistic’. For New York philosophy was dominated by naturalists in the interwar 
period. Especially at Columbia, the university where Nagel spent almost his entire career, a 
significant portion of the philosophy faculty (e.g. John Dewey, Irwin Edwin, Horace Leland 
Friess, John Herman Randall Jr., and F. J. E. Woodbridge) identified as naturalists. These 
‘Columbia naturalists’ defended a variety of approaches to metaphysics and epistemology – 
ranging from Woodbridge’s Aristotelian naturalism to Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism – but 
they were all opposed to “ontological and methodological [...] dualisms”, whether it be a 
sharp bifurcation between the natural and the supernatural or a strict distinction between 
empirical and speculative methods of inquiry (Randall Jr. 1944, 357).8  
 Nagel’s naturalism was especially influenced by the views of John Dewey, one of his 
teachers as a graduate student. Dewey, like Nagel, emphasized the methodological character 
of naturalism. In Experience and Nature, published just after Nagel entered graduate school, 
Dewey argues for a “philosophic method” that is modeled on the aposteriori methods used in 
everyday and scientific inquiry. Dewey (1925, 1) dubs this view “empirical naturalism” and 
contrasts it with the speculative methods of traditional philosophy: 
 
[The problem with a] non-empirical method of philosophizing is not that it depends upon 
theorizing, but that it fails to use [it …] as a path pointing and leading back to something in 
primary experience. The resulting failure is three-fold. First there is no verification, no effort even 
to test and check. What is even worse, secondly, is that the things of ordinary experience do not 
get enlargement and enrichment of meaning as they do when approached through the medium of 
 
7 One difficulty with interpreting the account defended in the first chapter of Cohen and Nagel’s An Introduction 
to Logic and Scientific Method is that it is very unclear to what extent Nagel contributed to the book. Archival 
evidence does not settle the issue, unfortunately. In a letter to Sidney Hook, Nagel complains that only a few 
phrases in the book are actually his (March 7, 1935, SHP). Carnap, on the other hand, reports that Nagel told 
him that he wrote the book almost by himself (November 14, 1934, RCP, 25-75-12). 
8 See Eldridge (2004) and Jewett (2011) for a history of the Columbia naturalists.  
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scientific principles and reasonings. This lack of function reacts, in the third place, back upon the 
philosophic subject-matter in itself. Not tested by being employed to see what it leads to in 
ordinary experience [...] this subject-matter becomes arbitrary, aloof [...] something which 
exclusively occupies a realm of its own without contact with the things of ordinary experience. 
(Dewey 1925, 6) 
 
Most importantly, Dewey had a similar view about the naturalist’s job description. Like 
Nagel, Dewey believed that it is the primary task of the philosopher to study the logic of 
inquiry. Although Dewey is rarely classified as a philosopher of science today, he was widely 
viewed as such in the first half of the twentieth century (Reichenbach 1939; Mirowski 2004). 
Dewey had been a practicing scientist until his early forties, founding one of the earliest 
psychological laboratories of the country, and his views about logic and scientific 
methodology – spelled out in his late-career magnum opus Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 
(1938) – formed the core of his pragmatic naturalism.9 
 Finally, there are strong connections between Nagel’s and Dewey’s views about 
ethics and politics. Most Columbia naturalists were socially engaged thinkers who played a 
role in the so-called “New York intellectuals” – a group of liberal-minded socialist democrats 
who regularly published in leftist journals like The Nation, New Republic, and, somewhat 
later, Partisan Review. The philosophical wing of this group was led by Nagel’s close friend 
Sidney Hook, who, until his change of heart in the late 1930s, tried to merge Dewey’s 
philosophy with Marxist theory.10 Both Dewey and Nagel considered moral and political 
theory to be integral parts of a naturalistic Weltanschauung. They both disliked traditional 
approaches to ethics and rejected the use of static a priori principles to solve moral and 
political dilemmas. Rather, they believed that moral inquiry should be guided by the same 
experimental approach that controls our everyday and scientific investigations. Moral and 
social problems arise when individual desires and interests are to be adjudicated with 
socially-defined ends. As such, moral judgments should be viewed as hypotheses, which can 
be tested by analyzing the interacting interests of the members of a social group. In his 
philosophical self-portrait, Nagel summarizes the view as follows: 
 
 
9 See Brown (2012) for an excellent overview of Dewey’s philosophy of science.  
10 For an overview, see Cooney (1986) and Reisch (2005, Ch. 3). Nagel’s own engagement with political and 
social affairs is evinced by his regular contributions to the above-mentioned periodicals. See, for example, 
“Dialectical Materialism in Science” (Nagel 1939/1956), “The Historian as a Moralist” (Nagel 1940/1956), and 
“On the Philosophical Battlefront” (Nagel 1948/1956). 
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I find it difficult to understand conceptions of the good which assign values an objective 
ontological status, independent of organic interests which generate desire. [...] This does not mean 
that the good or a value is to be identified with the objects of momentary desires. Desires, needs, 
or their objects are not primarily moral or immoral. Moral considerations arise only when [...] an 
organization of various interests is attempted. [...] The judgment that anything is a good [...] is a 
hypothesis which must be explored and evaluated in ways similar to those employed in the 
sciences. (Nagel 1935/1956, 50-51) 
 
Considering the strong similarity between their methodological naturalisms, their self-
professed job descriptions, and their moral and social views, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Nagel expressed his deep gratitude to Dewey in his dissertation, arguing that he found in the 
latter’s work “a basis for whatever philosophy I can also call my own” (Nagel 1931a, i).  
 
 
3.5. Philosophical Influences (2): Morris R. Cohen 
Despite the programmatic connections between Nagel’s and Dewey’s philosophies, the 
former’s day-to-day contributions strongly diverged from those of his teacher. Dewey was 
rarely concerned with what he called “modern formalistic logic” (1938, 182) and he seldom 
employed its tools in the analysis of inquiry.11 Nagel made more adequate use of the recent 
advances in the formal sciences, especially when they could help illuminate key 
methodological notions. Whereas Dewey, in The Quest for Certainty (1929), provided only 
informal characterizations of key methodological topics like measurement and probability, 
for example, Nagel aimed to provide more precise analyses by adopting an axiomatic 
approach to measurement (Nagel 1931a) and by developing a truth-frequency interpretation 
of probability (Nagel 1933a). 
 A second major difference between Nagel and Dewey is that the former was better 
versed in the European literature. Nagel had been born and raised in Nové Mesto, Bohemia 
(then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire) and had emigrated to the United States at age 10. 
Whereas Dewey was almost exclusively concerned with American philosophical and societal 
debates and predominantly responded to discussions that figured in New York-based 
publications like The Journal of Philosophy and New Republic, Nagel was also influenced by 
developments on the continent on which he was born. His truth-frequency interpretation of 
probability, for example, explicitly built on work of German contemporaries like Hans 
 
11 Dewey’s notion of ‘logic’ was more continuous with the traditional conception of Aristotle, Kant, and Mill. 
See Brown (2012, §4) for a reconstruction.  
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Reichenbach and Richard von Mises, and his theory of measurement was based on Russell’s 
and Campbell’s representational theories (see Section 3.3). Indeed, Nagel’s knowledge of the 
continental literature is evinced by his numerous reviews of especially Germanophone works 
in the philosophy of science.12  
 Nagel’s cosmopolitan outlook and formal approach to philosophy of science were 
likely stimulated by Morris R. Cohen, Nagel’s most prominent mentor during his student 
years. Cohen, who spent most of his career at the City College of New York, was an all-
round philosopher who contributed to a variety of disciplines – ranging from the philosophy 
of history to the philosophy of law – but primarily viewed himself a logician. Like Nagel, 
Cohen had been born in Eastern Europe and emigrated to the United States in his early teens. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, he had played an important role in the American 
reception of the new logic (e.g. the contributions of Frege, Peano, and Russell) via his 
reviews and publications.13 Nagel and Cohen’s shared approach is memorialized by their 
Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (Cohen and Nagel 1934), one of the first logic 
textbooks in the United States. 
 Philosophically, Cohen has been described as one of the most influential naturalists of 
the first half of the twentieth century (Larrabee 1944, 352 and Randall Jr. 1944, 363). 
Although he was wary of labels and never explicitly identified as a naturalist, he was viewed 
as such by Nagel, who described him as a “Platonic naturalist” in a 1928 homage to Cohen:  
 
Professor Cohen has been, ever since we knew him, a Platonic naturalist. He made many of us 
take for our own his pious attachment to nature as the source of our being, and accept the methods 
of the physical sciences as fruitful sources for a metaphysics. To be docile to the lessons of 
experience, but withal to seek blessedness in the shadow of the ideal. (Nagel 1928, 97) 
 
Cohen’s ‘Platonism’ was opposed to Dewey’s pragmatic approach, which the former 
dismissed as ‘anthropocentric naturalism’ (Cohen 1940). The distinction between the two is 
best reflected in their debate about the ‘ontological basis of logic’, a discussion that likely 
 
12 See, for example, Nagel’s reviews of Die Form des Erkennens by Wilhelm Grebe (Nagel 1930), Das 
Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung by Felix Kaufmann, and Geschichte der 
Naturphilosophie by Hugo Dingler (Nagel 1932). 
13 See, for example, Cohen’s review of Principia Mathematica by Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead 
(Cohen 1912), as well as his “The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics” (Cohen 1911) and “The 
Subject Matter of Formal Logic” (Cohen 1918). 
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influenced Nagel, considering the latter’s preoccupation with the philosophy of logic (see 
Section 3.3).14 
 Outside philosophy, Cohen probably also influenced Nagel through his role as a 
public intellectual. Like Dewey, Cohen was one of the prominent public philosophers of New 
York, as is evinced by his numerous contributions to especially New Republic.15 Throughout 
the interwar period, Cohen’s City College of New York was known for its political 
radicalism and many leaders of the ‘New York Intellectuals’ (e.g. Irving Kristol, S. M. 
Lipset, and Irving Howe) studied at the proverbial ‘Harvard of the Proletariat’. Nagel and 
Hook, too, had been Cohen’s students at CCNY, graduating in 1923, and were likely 
influenced by the latter’s political views. Indeed, both Nagel and Hook would later remember 
him for his genuine ‘liberalism’ and contributions to the New York intellectual community 
(Nagel 1957; Hook 1976).  
 
3. 6. Nagel’s First Encounters with Logical Positivism 
Considering Nagel’s formal approach, his knowledge of the European literature, and his view 
that it is the philosopher’s foremost job to analyze the logic of inquiry, it is perhaps no 
surprise that he was interested in the ideas of the Vienna Circle (led by Moritz Schlick) and 
the Berlin Group (led by Hans Reichenbach), which rapidly started to gain influence when 
Nagel got his first job at Columbia University. The Vienna Circle had recently published its 
manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (Hahn, Carnap, and Neurath 
1929/1973) and philosophers of science throughout Europe were actively advertising their 
novel views about meaning, method, and metaphysics via venues like Erkenntnis. In the 
United States, these views came to be known as ‘logical positivism’ after The Journal of 
Philosophy published the paper “Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European 
Philosophy”, describing the approach as a synthesis of the positivistic-empirical tradition of 
Mach and Poincaré and the logical tradition of Frege and Russell.16 
 Nagel appears to have been familiar with the new wave in continental philosophy of 
science even before logical positivism hit American shores. He occasionally cited work of 
 
14 For a reconstruction of the friendly opposition between Dewey and Cohen, see Rosenfield (1962, Ch. 10). 
15 A 1928 bibliography of Cohen lists more than 50 publications in the New Republic between 1914 and 1927 
(Lazar 1928, x-xi).  
16 The authors of the paper, Albert Blumberg and Herbert Feigl, were both former students of Schlick and had 
recently adopted positions at American universities. Schlick himself also spent a period in the United States, 
accepting a visiting professorship at Berkeley in the 1931-32 academic year. The joint efforts of Blumberg, 
Feigl, and Schlick contributed greatly to the American reception of logical positivism in the early 1930s. For a 
reconstruction, see Verhaegh (2020).  
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Schlick and Reichenbach in his earliest publications (e.g. Nagel 1929a; 1930) and he was the 
first American philosopher to publish an article in Erkenntnis (Nagel 1931b).17 In one of his 
memoirs, Nagel remembers that especially Reichenbach’s work had made a strong 
impression on him during his student years: 
 
I [...] studied with enormous profit [Reichenbach’s] Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre shortly 
after the book appeared in 1928. [...] Here is a philosopher after my own heart, I remember 
thinking, who takes seriously the classical conception of the task of philosophy to provide a 
solidly based interpretation of science and its logic. (Nagel 1978, 42) 
 
Although it is unclear whether Reichenbach’s work directly influenced Nagel’s development, 
there are strong connections between their views and research interests. They both were 
concerned with the conventionalist aspects of science (e.g. Reichenbach 1928; Nagel 1929a) 
and they both defended a frequentist interpretation of probability (e.g. Reichenbach 1932; 
Nagel 1933a).  
 Most likely, Nagel learned about Reichenbach’s views via his friend Sidney Hook, 
who had spent a year in Germany on a Guggenheim Fellowship in the late 1920s. Hook had 
participated in meetings of the Berlin Group and had attended Reichenbach’s seminars on 
philosophy of science and the theory of probability (Hook 1978). These encounters with 
Reichenbach had been the philosophical highlight of his year in Europe, as German 
philosophers outside the Berlin Group appeared to be unanimously opposed to his naturalism:  
 
With few exceptions, German philosophers constitute one great idealist family. [...] It is 
something taken for granted. [...] In a discussion of the implications of a doctrine, when the 
professor exclaims, ‘Aber, meine Herren, das ist Naturalismus,’ he means his hearers to 
understand that the position has been reduced to absurdity. Naturalism means Locke and an empty 
mind or John Stuart Mill and the possibility that 2+2=5. [...] William James seems to be the only 
American philosopher who is known – and he is more often ‘refuted’ than read. (Hook 1930, 144-
146) 
 
Reichenbach, however, was an important exception. Not only had he, in developing a 
“naturalistic interpretation of the a priori” proven to be a philosophical ally to the American 
naturalists (Hook 1930, 159-160), he was also a kindred spirit in ideological terms. In his 
“Memories of Hans Reichenbach”, Hook remembers:  
 
17 Nagel’s Erkenntnis paper (“Measurement”) was a revised version of a chapter in his dissertation. Paul Weiss, 
also a former student of Morris Cohen, published a paper in the same issue (Weiss 1931). 
 12 
 
I [found] Reichenbach’s philosophy congenial to my own pragmatic naturalism. [...] We became 
even friendlier when Reichenbach discovered that I had strong socialist views. He had never met 
an American socialist before and seemed as surprised to learn that there were American socialists 
as some proto-Nazi students at Munich had been when I told them that there was a Jewish 
proletariat in the United States. (Hook 1978, 33-34) 
 
Hook appears to have described the views of Reichenbach and his group in several letters to 
Nagel, who immediately started reading up on his work.18 It is probably also via Hook that 
Nagel learned about the views of Rudolf Carnap, who rapidly started to become more 
influential among European philosophers after the publication of Der Logische Aufbau der 
Welt (1928). In his “Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy”, Hook 
briefly mentions the work of Carnap – one of the latter’s first mentions in the American 
literature – but describes him as less naturalistic than Reichenbach, likely because he knew 
that the Vienna Circle, at the time, disagreed with the latter’s views about the aims of 
scientific philosophy.19 
 Nagel, too, was critical of Carnap’s work in the early 1930s. He was especially 
opposed to (what he perceived to be) some of Carnap’s central theses in the Aufbau. In 
“Verifiability, Truth, and Verification” (1934a), Nagel critically examines Carnap’s 
translational reductionism, the view that “the meaning of a proposition is to be obtained by 
translating it into others until only such appear whose meaning may be directly apprehended 
in sense” (1934a, 146). Nagel’s main problem with this thesis is that it is incompatible with 
his aforementioned holistic perspective on theory testing (see Section 3.2). Since any 
verifying process has “value only within a framework of pre-existing knowledge” (1934a, 
143, original emphasis), there can be no such thing as a directly apprehended proposition. 
Any test presupposes a large body of knowledge: 
 
[A]tomic propositions [...] require verification in terms of controlled observation, significant only 
against the background of theoretical assumptions, and therefore inviting further verification. [...] 
The doctrine of crucial experiments is inadequate, it is well known, because it is the whole body 
 
18 Unfortunately, Hook’s letters to Nagel from the late 1920s are lost. Nagel’s responses to Hook, however, 
reveal that the former started reading Philosophie der Raum-Zeit Lehre in the fall 1928, shortly after Hook had 
arrived in Germany (Nagel to Hook, September 4, 1928, SHP). Hook must also have told Reichenbach about 
Nagel’s work. For a few months later, Nagel writes that Reichenbach sent him a reprint of “Ziele und Wege der 
physikalischen Erkenntnis” (Reichenbach 1929). See Nagel to Hook (July 23, 1929, SHP).  
19 For a reconstruction of the theoretical tensions between the Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle in the early 
1930s, see Milkov (2013), Dewulf (2020, §2), and Verhaegh (forthcoming-b).  
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of relevant theory which is brought to an experimental test, and not an isolated proposition. The 
theory of [...] the final and indubitable apprehension of atomic facts, is inadequate for the same 
reason. (Nagel 1934a, 146)20 
 
Just as we can only test the pendulum law for a particular swinging bob by presupposing a 
host of knowledge about the experimental set up, the measurement tools, and the behavior of 
free-falling bodies, we can only test an observational proposition like “this is darker than 
that’ by fixating background conditions about brightness, lighting conditions, and spatial 
coincidence (1934a, 142-144).  
 Little did Nagel know that Carnap, about a year before, had started to change his 
views about what he by then called ‘protocol sentences’. Spurred by Otto Neurath, the 
Vienna Circle’s proponent of physicalist naturalism, Carnap now accepted the view that 
protocol sentences are relative and revisable (Carnap 1932, 469).21 Nagel was about to find 
out, however, for he had just been awarded a Guggenheim fellowship that allowed him to 
spend a year in Europe to familiarize himself with the newest trends in continental 
philosophy of science. It was this grant that would soon be taking him to Carnap in Prague, 
where he stayed for three crucial weeks to talk about syntax, science, and socialism.  
 
3.7. Prague 
Nagel boarded an ocean liner on August 18, 1934 and arrived in France about a week later. In 
his first days in Europe, Nagel attended the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy in 
Prague. Philosophically, the conference was “dull and fatiguing” (Nagel to Hook, September 
8, 1934, SHP). In an extensive report for the Journal of Philosophy, Nagel complained that 
there was a “woeful lack of clarity, of analysis, of appeal to logic and empirical findings” and 
that “a majority of the papers were simply occasions for despair to all those who do not view 
philosophy as a substitute for music and poetry” (1934b, 600). Nagel was particularly 
worried because several philosophers were using the stage to argue for fascism and Kultur-
intoleranz. In his report, he explained that the conference was fraught with “notes of national 
and social conflict”, describing plenary sessions in which speakers defended the fascist state 
or the view that every genuine culture is intolerant toward all others (Nagel 1934b, 589-596).  
 
20 Note that Carnap never talks about ‘atomic propositions’ in the Aufbau. Nagel’s choice of words here is 
probably influenced by Blumberg and Feigl, who described the Aufbau as a book in which “all complex 
propositions are reduced to sets of atomic propositions which are unanalyzable” (1931, 287). 
21 For a reconstruction of Carnap’s development on this score, see Uebel (2007) and Carus (2007). 
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 Less controversial was the first meeting of the Unity of Science movement, which had 
taken place a few days before and where the “nazis were not seen nor heard” (Nagel to Hook, 
September 8, 1934, SHP). Nagel had briefly met Reichenbach, Carnap, and a number of other 
key European philosophers of science and had used these exchanges to schedule research 
visits in Vienna, Warsaw, Lvov, Prague, and Istanbul. He had been especially excited to meet 
Reichenbach, who turned out to be interested in Nagel’s work and was curious to learn more 
about job opportunities in the United States. Reichenbach was “not happy” with his position 
in Istanbul (ibid.), which he had accepted after the Nazi government had dismissed him from 
his job in Berlin, and he had asked Nagel to help him find an American publisher for his book 
Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre (Reichenbach 1935) in order to promote his work in the United 
States. 
 Despite his enthusiasm about meeting Reichenbach, it was Carnap who had the 
biggest impact on Nagel’s development during his first months in Europe. After brief visits to 
Vienna, Warsaw, and Lvov, Nagel returned to Prague in November to spend three weeks 
with the German professor. He had been reading the latter’s Logische Syntax der Sprache in 
his first weeks abroad (Nagel to Hook, October 3, 1934, SHP) but it was in Prague that Nagel 
learned about Carnap’s new views in detail. Not only did the latter’s revised ideas about 
protocol sentences accommodate his worries about Carnap’s translational reductionism (see 
Section 3.6), he was especially impressed with his analysis of traditional philosophical 
problems, such as the question of the ontological status of logic (see Section 3.3). According 
to Carnap, philosophical problems are disguised questions about the syntax of language and 
to interpret them as questions about reality is to be confused about the nature of philosophical 
questions. Philosophical theses are often posed in what Carnap called the material mode of 
speech (in which we talk about facts and things) but should actually be phrased in the formal 
mode of speech (in which we talk about propositions and thing-words). Already after his first 
few meetings with Carnap, Nagel writes that he is “much taken with the neatness [...] with 
which [Carnap] gets rid of some skeletons”, that he is “half convinced that [his own] frequent 
to-do with the ‘ontological basis’ of formal logic is a mistake”, and that he is “not sure what 
is left of the problem when it gets formulated in [Carnap’s] ‘formal mode’ of speaking” 
(Nagel to Hook, November 19, 1934, SHP). Two weeks later, Nagel even describes himself 
as ‘under the influence of the positivists’ and wonders whether Carnap’s approach does not 
offer a more solid foundation for naturalism than the ‘muddy’ philosophizing of his teachers 
Dewey and Cohen:  
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At this distance, and under the influence of the positivists, Dewey's psychologizings and failures 
to come to grips with the detailed structure of scientific theories seem very serious shortcomings, 
and I am sure ‘our brand’ of naturalism will be better served by overcoming them. I have the 
sense now that in spite of Dewey’s attention to language he has never been able to show 
convincingly how to squeeze out the Platonism and absolutism from the sciences. And in general, 
the Columbia philos. dept. seems like a home for poets who have missed their vocation. But this 
is perhaps a passing mood, induced by contact with Carnap. He really has shown me that a man 
can have a larger vision, without being simply ecstatic or, as in the case of Dewey and Cohen, 
very muddy. (Nagel to Hook, December 3, 1934) 
 
 Nagel was not only impressed by Carnap’s philosophy. The impact of the Prague 
weeks was reinforced by the latter’s hospitality. Nagel, who was traveling alone because he 
was afraid to cause a “scandal of some proportions” if he and his then girlfriend Edith 
Haggstrom were to travel through Europe as an unmarried couple (ibid., November 28, 
1934), had been very lonely during his first months in Europe. In a letter to Hook, Nagel had 
even described his mood as a state of “near-panic” (September 27, 1934, SHP). He had had a 
few isolated meetings with logicians in Warsaw and Lvov but he had grown increasingly 
depressed about living in cities where he did not speak the language and where Jews were 
treated in an “unbelievably shocking” way (ibid., October 17, 1934). His weeks with Rudolf 
and Ina, however, felt like a warm blanket. The Carnaps had been “extremely” hospitable, 
basically opening their house to Nagel in the weeks that he stayed in Prague22 and they had 
been very tolerant about his private affairs, encouraging him to bring Edith to Europe and to 
let them stay with the Carnaps for a while (ibid., November 28, 1934). Most importantly, 
Nagel and the Carnaps shared the same political views. Both the former’s correspondence 
and the latter’s diary reveal that they extensively discussed the political situation in Europe, 
their views about the disappointing performance of the social democrats, and their 
sympathies for communism and Trotskyism, even though they both opposed Trotsky’s “petty 
politics” and the dogmatism of the communist party.23  
 
3.8. Cambridge 
Nagel left Prague in early December. And although he briefly returned to Austria to attend 
two meetings of the Vienna Circle, he used most of his remaining months to sooth his 
 
22 Carnap’s diary shows that he and Nagel met fifteen times between November 10 and December 5, meetings 
that often started early in the afternoon and lasted until late in the evening (RCP, 25-75-12). 
23 See, for example, Carnap’s diary entry for November 18, 1934 (RCP, 25-75-12) and Nagel’s letter to Hook 
from November 19, 1934 (SHP). 
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‘frazzled nerves’. In January, Edith travelled to Europe and they spent the first four months of 
1935 in France and Italy. Nagel felt guilty about the lack of philosophical activity in this 
period24 but still decided to cancel his plans to visit Reichenbach in Istanbul. Traveling to 
Turkey would take too much time and there was a big chance that the latter would be coming 
to New York as a visiting professor in the next academic year.25  
 Only the final two months of Nagel’s stay were devoted to serious meetings with 
European philosophers. After a few days in the Netherlands, where he visited Arend Heyting 
and Otto Neurath, Nagel spent his last weeks in England. In his college days, Nagel had 
viewed Cambridge as the “holy of holies in philosophy” (Nagel to Hook, May 18, 1935, 
SHP) since it was the place where Russell and Whitehead had written the Principia 
Mathematica and where Norman Campbell had developed his representational theory of 
measurement. Once in England, however, Nagel quickly came to the conclusion that 
Cambridge was “no longer the intellectual Mecca” it had seemed to be when he was a college 
student (ibid., June 4, 1935). He attended lectures of G. E. Moore, John Wisdom, and D. C. 
Broad but was disillusioned by the state of the Cambridge school of analysis:  
 
I [...] must say that on the whole I am disappointed. It is just analysis after analysis, but nothing 
seems to come out of it, and in the end they are less clear what it is they really mean than in the 
beginning [...] the Cambridge style is no longer my ideal of what philosophy should be like. (May 
26, 1935)26 
 
His first meeting with Wittgenstein was rather disenchanting as well: 
 
I went to see Wittgenstein this week for permission to attend his lectures. He tore his hair, 
groaned, said it was impossible [...] that he couldn’t lecture with a stranger in the room, that I 
should ‘spare him that’, etc.… Most of the people around here think he is absolutely the greatest 
man that lives and ever lived. Maybe it’s true, but I wish I could have some evidence for it. I have 
seen some notes W. had mim[e]ographed last year and distributed; but they are terribly chaotic, 
and the few flashes of light they contain are not enough to judge by. (ibid.) 
 
 
24 Between January and April, Nagel’s only seems to have briefly met Federigo Enriques and George Santayana. 
In a letter to Hook, Nagel writes: “[W]hen I think of other people going off for a year and returning home with 
well filled note-books or finished manuscripts … I wish I would never have to return. It will take years for me to 
catch up” (Nagel to Hook, March 14, 1935, SHP). 
25 See Nagel to Reichenbach (July 22, 1935, HRP, 013-51-02). Hook had offered his old friend a one-year 
position at New York University. For a reconstruction, see Verhaegh (forthcoming-b).  
26 See also Nagel to Cohen (June 4, 1935): “I am a little disappointed with what I have found in Cambridge [...] 
perhaps in the days when Russell was here it may have been worth the pilgrimage. I still find the atmosphere 
invigorating. [...] But I am hankering for thicker air” (Cited in Rosenfield 1962, 400). 
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 Nagel’s period in England also had positive sides, however. He enjoyed meeting 
Susan Stebbing and was enthralled by A. J. Ayer’s and Max Black’s talks at a meeting of the 
Aristotelian Society (“better than anything I’ve seen at our sessions”).27 In addition, Nagel 
was pleasantly surprised to learn that there was an undercurrent of pragmatic naturalism in 
Cambridge. He had a chance to get a hold of some unpublished manuscripts from Frank 
Ramsey and was excited to read “how far Ramsay [sic] went in the direction of a Peirce-
Deweyan pragmatism [...] advocating in part an instrumental theory of thought and a general 
‘fallibilism’” (ibid., June 23, 1935).28 When he expressed his surprise in a meeting with R. B. 
Braithwaite, the latter ensured him that Ramsey was not the only Cantabrigian to be defend 
such a perspective, explaining that “the published works of the Cambridge men [...] should 
not be taken as indicating of what [is] the accepted doctrine” (ibid.). Just as Carnap had 
presented him with a model to combine his naturalism with the clarity and the precision of 
the logical positivists,29 Ramsey’s manuscripts confirmed that it is possible to reconcile 
pragmatic naturalism with rigorous analysis. 
 
3.9. Impressions and Appraisals 
In July 1935, Nagel returned to New York, where he used his newly acquired knowledge to 
update the American public about developments in Europe. He wrote a popular piece about 
logical empiricism in a literary magazine (Nagel 1938c, 59) and he published reviews of 
work by, among others, Carnap, Reichenbach, Tarski, and Black (Nagel 1935b, 1936c, 
1938a, 1938b, 1938d). Most importantly, Nagel published an influential two-part paper 
“Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe” (1936a, 1936b) in the 
Journal of Philosophy. In this paper, often credited as one of the first publications to use the 
term ‘analytic philosophy’ in print (Frost-Arnold 2007), Nagel describes the views of 
Wittgenstein, Moore, Schlick, Neurath, Carnap, and the Polish logicians, examining in detail 
their common focus on analysis and clarification: 
 
In the first place, the men with whom I talked are impatient with philosophic systems built in the 
traditionally grand manner. Their preoccupation is with philosophy as analysis; they take for 
granted a body of authentic knowledge acquired by the special sciences, and are concerned not 
 
27 See Nagel to Hook (ca. May 1935 and July 9, 1935, SHP). 
28 See Misak (2016) for a reconstruction of Cambridge pragmatism in this period. 
29 In a later report for the Guggenheim Foundation, Nagel would write that Carnap represented the wing of the 
Wiener Kreis “which converged on the ideas familiar from Peirce and Dewey” (“Impressions of European 
Universities: The Nineteen-Thirties”, undated document, ENP, Box 4). 
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with adding to it [...] but with clarifying its meaning and implications. (1936a, 6, original 
emphases)  
 
Nagel’s paper also explicitly thematizes the connection between ‘analytic philosophy’ and 
American naturalism. Although Nagel recognized that most of the Europeans he visited are 
suspicious of comprehensive “philosophic systems”, he maintains that they all subscribe to “a 
common-sense naturalism”, accepting as a matter of course “the mechanisms which science 
progressively discovers” (1936a, 7). 
 Of all the philosophers discussed in “Impressions and Appraisals”, Nagel is clearly 
most sympathetic to Carnap. Whereas the paper is somewhat negative about the Cambridge 
philosophers and argues that it is not easy to see, “without lapsing into the personal and the 
impertinent”, why philosophers in the U.K. are so fascinated by Moore and Wittgenstein 
(1936a, 10), he introduces Carnap in exceptionally laudatory terms: 
 
I chanced to hear Carnap take part in a discussion before knowing who the speaker was, and was 
immediately impressed by the gentle force of a luminous mind. I listened to him subsequently, in 
classroom and seminar as well as in private, and thought I understood what Emerson meant when 
he described character as a reserved force acting directly by presence, apparently without means. 
As a lecturer I found him admirably lucid, as the leader of his seminar incisive and yet 
sympathetic. In private discussions he was a patient listener to my problems, clarifying them not 
only by suggesting solutions, but answering many by reformulating the difficulties. He is one of 
the rare people with whom one does not have to agree in order to be understood by him. I had a 
sense of immeasurable thoroughness and of untouched intellectual resources by almost everything 
he said. (Nagel 1936b, 44-45) 
 
Nagel’s description of Carnap as a ‘gentle’ and ‘patient’ thinker is likely a response to the 
largely negative American reception of the latter’s early views. In the United States, Carnap 
was best-known for his staunch solipsism and his ideas had been criticized even by 
philosophers generally sympathetic to verificationist theories of meaning (e.g. Lewis 1934; 
Morris 1934).30 Whether or not the American reading of Carnap’s early views was accurate, 
Nagel’s paper seems designed to correct this image: more than seventeen pages of the article 
are devoted to an extensive analysis of Carnap’s ‘new’ ideas (1936b, 32-49). Nagel 
introduces the distinction between “left wing” and “right wing” logical positivism and shows 
 
30 In addition, most of Nagel’s teachers at Columbia disliked logical positivism. In a letter to Neurath, Nagel 
explains that “the ‘old-timers’ distrust it, dislike it, and pretend that it has nothing very interesting to say” 
(January 2, 1936, ONN, item 275). 
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that the former faction no longer believes that there is a “theoretically necessary ultimate 
terminus to the process of verification”:  
 
The dogmatism of indubitable atomic facts is replaced by the view that every protocol is 
theoretically capable of further verification. From a broad point of view there is no difference in 
kind between the verification of a theory and the verification of a singular proposition. Both are 
hypotheses, which commit their asserters to an indefinite series of further propositions. [...] 
Carnap’s wing in the Vienna Circle believes that not only is this revised theory of meaning and 
verification more faithful than the original one to the actual procedure of science, but that the 
annoying solipsism of the earlier version is made completely innocuous. (Nagel 1936b, 34-35) 
 
As this is exactly what Nagel himself had proposed in his own critical analysis of Carnap’s 
views two years before (see Section 3.6), it is no surprise that he presents the latter’s new 
position as an improvement. Nagel also sympathetically discusses Carnap’s physicalism, 
which he connects to his own opposition to methodological dualisms (see Sections 3.2-3.3). 
Nagel explains that Carnap’s physicalism should be viewed as a “protest against” the “sharp 
division between Natur and Geisteswissenschaften”, and interprets the latter’s “unity of 
science” thesis in strongly naturalistic terms, arguing that it “asserts in so many words that 
the subject-matter for all empirical inquiry is the world of spatio-temporal events” and that “a 
common logical method is applicable in every department of knowledge” (1936b, 40-41). 
 
3.10. Naturalism reconsidered 
“Impressions and Appraisals” played a major role in the American reception of logical 
empiricism and its publication likely helped Carnap to find a position in the United States. 
The paper was published in January 1936, a few weeks before Carnap started an extensive 
American lecture tour that would take him to, among others, Columbia University and that 
would result in two job offers. Carnap was thankful for Nagel’s support because it helped 
him in his attempts to correct the American misunderstandings about his philosophy 
(Verhaegh forthcoming-a). When the Carnaps arrived in the United States, they were awaited 
by Ernest and Edith Nagel, now a married couple and eager to be as hospitable as the 
Carnaps had been a year before.31  
 Reichenbach was less happy with “Impressions and Appraisals”, however. Nagel had 
only mentioned him in a footnote, explaining that exigencies of space made it impossible to 
 
31 See Carnap’s diary (RCP 025-82-01) and Nagel’s letter to Neurath (January 2, 1936, ONN, item 275).  
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include a discussion of the latter’s views about induction and probability (1936b, 30n2). In 
February 1936, Reichenbach sent Nagel a letter in which he explained his disappointment. 
The paper, Reichenbach maintained, portrays logical empiricism as a movement that is 
primarily interested in “abstract discussions about meaning”. Nagel primarily had eye for 
views that were either “unfruitfully dogmatic” (Schlick’s) or “unfruitfully conventionalistic” 
(Carnap’s) and ignored the more subtle ideas that had been developed by Reichenbach’s 
now-scattered Berlin group. About a month later, Reichenbach published an alternative 
perspective on “logicistic empiricism” in the Journal of Philosophy, introducing the 
American public to the work of his Berlin group.32 Reichenbach’s strong response to 
“Impressions and Appraisals” was likely induced by his personal situation. The Turkish 
government had blocked his visiting position in New York and he was more desperate than 
ever to find a job in the United States (see Verhaegh forthcoming-b). Still, the letter soured 
the relation between Nagel and Reichenbach for a few years. Indeed, Nagel’s review of 
Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, published a few months later, was lukewarm at best and argues 
that Reichenbach merely sketches but fails to work out in detail a convincing theory of 
probability (Nagel 1936c; see also Reichenbach 1938 and Nagel 1938d).  
 Although Nagel played an important role in promoting Carnap’s philosophy in the 
United States, it would be a mistake to view him as a philosophical convert.33 Nagel 
incorporated elements of Carnap’s program into his own philosophy but he always viewed 
them as friendly amendments, never as a challenge to his naturalism. The most notable 
example of such an amendment is Carnap’s perspective on the nature of logic. Whereas 
Nagel had toyed with metaphysical interpretations of logic in the first phase of his career (see 
Section 3.3), he came to view Carnap’s position as superior, arguing that logical systems are 
linguistic proposals aimed at aiding scientists in their everyday inquiries: 
 
The various systems of formal logic must [...] be viewed not as accounts of the ‘true nature’ of an 
antecedently identifiable relation of ‘implication’, but as alternative proposals for specifying 
usages and for performing inferences. [...] If everyday language requires to be completed and 
 
32 See Reichenbach to Nagel (February 15, 1936, HRP, 013-51-01) and Reichenbach (1936). Reichenbach’s 
negative portrayal of Carnap’s position was not a surprise to Nagel. In Europe, Nagel had already noted that 
Reichenbach and Carnap respected each other but were far from friends. In a letter to Hook, Nagel wrote: “I 
don’t think [Carnap] and Reichenbach love one another, I had that impression from Reichenbach when I saw 
him, and get hints of it from mrs. Carnap; he of course is the essence of courtesy and admiration. I think 
R[eichenbach]’s cock[i]ness gets on the Carnaps’ nerves, while Carnap’s preciseness must irritate 
R[eichenbach]” (December 3, 1934, SNP). 
33 Unlike Quine, who, after spending a few weeks in Prague in 1933, came to perceive himself as Carnap’s 
“disciple” for a number of years. See Quine (1970, 41) and, for a reconstruction, Verhaegh (ms.). 
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reorganized for the sake of attaining the ends of inquiry, the ‘justification’ for a proposed set of 
regulative principles [...] can be given only in terms of the adequacy of the proposed changes as 
means or instruments for attaining the envisaged ends. (Nagel 1944/1956, 76-77) 
 
Nagel first extensively discussed this new perspective in his contribution to Naturalism and 
the Human Spirit, often considered the Columbia naturalists’ philosophical manifesto, 
showing that he viewed his new position as an amendment rather than as a dismissal of 
naturalism. Indeed, Nagel sets up his paper by discussing his Carnapian account as one of 
three possible naturalistic perspectives on logic before he goes on to argue that the new 
position is the most plausible option.  
 There are a few reasons as to why Nagel never felt the need to abandon naturalism in 
the wake of his trip to Europe. First and foremost, Nagel believed the continental 
philosophers to be (closeted) naturalists themselves. I have mentioned Nagel’s attempts to 
connect analytic philosophy to American naturalism in “Impressions and Appraisals” 
(Section 3.9) but he repeats this assessment in his 1954 presidential address to the APA 
Eastern Division Meeting. In this address, titled “Naturalism Reconsidered”, Nagel argues 
that although analytic philosophers are wary of comprehensive philosophical perspectives 
and have directed their attention to the resolution of “limited problems and puzzles”, most of 
them implicitly share a naturalistic Weltanschauung: 
 
Some of us [...] have dismissed as utterly trivial most if not all [...] analytical philosophy. I do not 
share this distress [...]. Concentration on limited and determinate problems has yielded valuable 
fruits. [...] On the other hand, philosophers like other men conduct their lives within the 
framework of certain comprehensive if not always explicit assumptions about the world they 
inhabit. These assumptions color evaluations of major ideals and proposed policies. [...] It is 
clearly desirable that such basic intellectual commitments [...] be made as explicit as possible [...]. 
[T]his evening seems to me an appropriate occasion for stating as simply and a succinctly as I can 
the substance of those intellectual commitments I like to call ‘naturalism’. (Nagel 1954/1956, 5) 
 
For Nagel, naturalism and logical empiricism were compatible. The naturalist, like the 
empiricist, is skeptical of traditional systems of philosophy. Indeed, Nagel himself had 
defended a contextualist picture of inquiry from the very beginning of his academic career 
(see Section 3.2). Just as Nagel combined detailed analyses of measurement, probability, and 
verification with a strong commitment to methodological naturalism, he believed that the 
work of the empiricists, too, was compatible with a naturalistic outlook.  
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 An additional reason as to why Nagel did not dismiss naturalism is that he believed 
some of Carnap’s analyses to be fundamentally misguided. That is, even if Carnap’s program 
were a genuine alternative to American naturalism, Nagel would not have adopted it. 
Especially Carnap’s ideas about ethics and esthetics were an eyesore to Nagel.34 In his 
popular piece on logical empiricism, Nagel dismissed the positivists’ views on ethics as 
“superficial” and even in “Impressions and Appraisals” he rejects Carnap’s position: 
  
Perhaps the least satisfactory part of Carnap’s views is his analysis of the propositions of ethics 
and esthetics. Ethical norms are declared to be imperatives and not statements capable of truth or 
falsity. [...] But it is surely not the case that ethical propositions are necessarily either assertions 
about some transcendental autonomous realm of values or statements simply about human 
feelings. They can be conceived as hypotheses concerning ways of organizing or reorganizing the 
human scene in the interests of the well-being of its members. Ethical statements would still be 
empirical and would refer to the want and the capacities of living beings; but they would be more 
than records of private feelings of those who make them. (Nagel 1936b, 48-49) 
 
Although the two were like-minded in their political views (see Section 3.7), in other words, 
Nagel believed that Carnap failed to successfully incorporate them into his worldview.35 
 Second, Nagel believed that Carnap carried his syntactical analyses too far. Nagel, we 
have seen, was happy to adopt Carnap’s suggestion that logical systems are linguistic 
proposals. He was dissatisfied, however, with the latter’s attempts to extend his linguistic 
approach to philosophical systems more generally. Naturalism, for Nagel, is not a proposal. It 
is an empirically justified Weltanschauung, intellectually superior to the major alternatives 
American philosophers were offering (most notably, idealism and theism): 
 
When naturalists give their allegiance to [...] the method of modern empirical science, they do so 
because that method appears to be the most assured way of achieving reliable knowledge. As 
judged by that method, the evidence in my opinion is at present conclusive for the truth of 
naturalism, and it is tempting to suppose that no one familiar with the evidence can fail to 
acknowledge that philosophy. Indeed, some commentators there are who assert that all 
philosophies are at bottom only expressions in different idioms [...] so that the strife of 
philosophic systems is mainly a conflict over essentially linguistic matters. But too many thinkers 
for whom I have profound respect explicitly reject naturalism, and their espousal of contrary 
 
34 Other examples are Carnap’s approach to semantics (Nagel 1942) and inductive logic (Nagel 1963). See 
Tuboly (forthcoming) and Mormann (this volume) for a discussion. 
35 This is not to say that Nagel’s assessment is correct. Carus (2007), for example, argues that Carnap did 
incorporate his socio-political views into his philosophy.  
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views seems to me incompatible with the irenic claim that we really are in agreement on 
fundamentals. (Nagel 1954/1956, 12)  
 
Nagel, in sum, remained a committed naturalist. His encounters with European philosophers 
of science had offered him a way to replace his teachers’ ‘muddy’ theories with rigorous 
analyses.36 Still, Nagel never gave up on naturalism itself. Even in 1954, twenty years after 
his year in Europe, when Nagel had the honor to be the first self-identifying analytic 
philosopher to read a presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, he 
chose to portray himself a naturalist, arguing that naturalism “embraces a generalized account 
of the cosmic scheme [...] as well as a logic of inquiry” (1954/1956, 6). 
 
3.11. Archival sources 
Ernest Nagel Papers. Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University. 
Hans Reichenbach Papers. Archives of Scientific Philosophy. Hillman Library, University of 
Pittsburgh. 
Otto Neurath Papers. Wiener Kreis Archiv, Noord-Hollands Archief, Haarlem. 
Rudolf Carnap Papers. Archives of Scientific Philosophy. Hillman Library, University of 
Pittsburgh. 
Sidney Hook Papers. Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford University 
 
3.12. References  
Adams, E. W. (1966). On the Nature and Purpose of Measurement. Synthese 16 (2): 125-169. 
Blumberg, A., and Feigl, H. (1931). Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European 
Philosophy. The Journal of Philosophy 28 (11): 281-296. 
Brown, M. J. (2012). John Dewey’s Philosophy of Science. HOPOS: The Journal of the 
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2: 258-306. 
Carnap, R. (1928). Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag. 
Carnap, R. (1932). Über Protokollsätze. Erkenntnis 3 (1): 204-214. 
Carus, A. W. (2007). Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
36 Indeed, in one of his rare retrospectives, Nagel writes that that the “vigorous and technically precise” methods 
of the logical empiricists were “salutary stimuli” to his own development, compelling him to “re-examine 
assumptions” and “to take a stand on a number of issues on which [his] earlier teachers were [...] unclear” 
(1956, xii). 
 24 
Cohen, M. R. (1911). The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics. The Journal of 
Philosophy 8 (20): 533-546. 
Cohen, M. R. (1912). Review of Principia Mathematica by A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand 
Russell. The Philosophical Review 21: 87. 
Cohen, M. R. (1918). The Subject Matter of Formal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy 15 
(25): 673-688. 
Cohen, M. R. (1940). Some Difficulties in Dewey’s Anthropocentric Naturalism. The 
Philosophical Review 49 (2): 196-228. 
Cohen, M. R., and Nagel, E. (1934). An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Cooney, T. A. (1986). The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: Partisan Review and Its 
Circle. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
De Caro, M., and Macarthur, D. (eds.). (2004). Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and Nature. London: George Allen & Unwin.  
Dewey, J. (1929). The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch & Company. 
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Dewulf, F. (2020). The Place of Historiography in the Network of Logical Empiricism. 
Intellectual History Review 30 (2): 321-345. 
Eldridge, M. (2004). Naturalism. In A. T. Marsoobian and J. Ryder (eds.), The Blackwell 
Guide to American Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, philosophy 52-71. 
Frost-Arnold, G. (2017). The Rise of ‘Analytic Philosophy’: When and how did people begin 
calling themselves ‘analytic philosophers’? In S. Lapointe and C. Pincock (eds.). 
Innovations in the. History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave, 27-67. 
Grossman, M. (1928). A Tribute to Professor Morris Raphael Cohen: Teacher and 
Philosopher. New York. 
Hahn, H., Neurath, O., and Carnap, R. (1929/1973). The Scientific Conception of the World: 
The Vienna Circle. In R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath (eds.). Otto Neurath: Empiricism 
and Sociology. Dordrecht: Reidel, 299-318. 
Hook, S. (1930). A Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy. The Journal 
of Philosophy 27 (6): 141-160. 
Hook, S. (1976). Morris Cohen: Fifty Years Later. The American Scholar 45 (3): 426-436. 
 25 
Hook, S. (1978). Memories of Hans Reichenbach, 1928 and Later. In M. Reichenbach and R. 
S. Cohen (eds.), Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings 1909-1953. Volume I. 
Dordrecht: Reidel, 32-35. 
Jewett, A. (2011). Canonizing Dewey: Naturalism, Logical Empiricism, and the Idea of 
American Philosophy. Modern Intellectual History 8 (1): 91-125. 
Kallen, H. M. and Hook, S. (1935). American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow. New York: 
Lee Furman. 
Krikorian, Y. (ed.) (1944). Naturalism and the Human Spirit. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
Larrabee, H. A. (1944). Naturalism in America. In Krikorian (1944): 319-353.  
Lazar, N. (1928). Bibliography of Published Writings of Professor Morris Raphael Cohen 
(1901-1927). In Grossman (1928): vii-xii 
Lewis, C. I. (1934). Experience and Meaning. The Philosophical Review 43 (2): 125-146. 
Michell, J. (1992). The Origins of the Representational Theory of Measurement: Helmholtz, 
Hölder, and Russell. Studies in the history and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (2): 
185-206. 
Michell, J. (2004). Measurement in Psychology: A Critical History of a Methodological 
Concept. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Milkov, N. (2013). The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences. In 
N. Milkov, and V. Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical 
Empiricism. Dordrecht: Springer, 3-32. 
Mirowski, P. (2004). The Scientific Dimensions of Social Knowledge and their Distant 
Echoes in the 20th-Century American Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part A 35: 283-326. 
Morris, C. W. (1934). Pragmatism and Metaphysics. The Philosophical Review 43 (6): 549-
564. 
Misak, C. (2016). Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and 
Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Nagel, E. (1928). Appreciation. In Grossman (1928): 95-98. 
Nagel, E. (1929a). Nature and Convention. The Journal of Philosophy 26 (7): 169-182. 
Nagel, E. (1929b). Intuition, Consistency, and the Excluded Middle. The Journal of 
Philosophy 26 (18): 477-489. 
Nagel, E. (1929c). Can Logic be Divorced from Ontology? The Journal of Philosophy 26 
(26): 705-712. 
 26 
Nagel, E. (1930). Review of Die Form des Erkennens by Wilhelm Grebe. The Journal of 
Philosophy 27 (25): 697-699. 
Nagel, E. (1931a). On the Logic of Measurement. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University. 
Nagel, E. (1931b). Measurement. Erkenntnis 2: 313-335. 
Nagel, E. (1932). Reviews of Das Endliche der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung by Felix 
Kaufmann; Philosophie der Logik und Arithmetik by Hugo Dingler; Das Problem des 
Satzes vom Ausgeschlossenen Dritter by Paul Hofmann. The Journal of Philosophy 29 
(15): 401-409. 
Nagel, E. (1933a). A Frequency Theory of Probability. The Journal of Philosophy 30 (20): 
533-554. 
Nagel, E. (1933b). Charles Peirce’s Guesses at the Riddle. The Journal of Philosophy 30 
(14): 365-386. 
Nagel, E. (1934a). Verifiability, truth, and verification. The Journal of Philosophy 31 (6): 
141-148. 
Nagel, E. (1934b). The Eighth International Congress of Philosophy. The Journal of 
Philosophy 32 (22): 589-601.  
Nagel, E. (1935/1956). Notes Toward a Naturalistic Conception of Logic. In Logic without 
Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, Ill: The Free 
Press, 39-54. 
Nagel, E. (1935a). The Logic of Reduction in the Sciences. Erkenntnis 5: 46-52.  
Nagel, E. (1935b). Review of Logische Syntax der Sprache by Rudolf Carnap. The Journal of 
Philosophy 32 (2): 49-52. 
Nagel, E. (1936a). Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. I. The 
Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 5-24. 
Nagel, E. (1936b). Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe. II. The 
Journal of Philosophy 33 (2): 29-53. 
Nagel, E. (1936c). Review of Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre by Hans Reichenbach. Mind, 45 
(180): 501-514. 
Nagel, E. (1938a). Review of Einführung in die Mathematische Logik by Alfred Tarski. 
Philosophy of Science 5 (2): 232-233. 
Nagel, E. (1938b). Review of Vagueness: An Exercise in Logical Analysis by Max Black. 
The Journal of Symbolic Logic 3 (1): 48-49. 
Nagel, E. (1938c). The Fight for Clarity: Logical Empiricism. The American Scholar 8 (1): 
45-59. 
 27 
Nagel, E. (1938d). Review of Experience and Prediction by Hans Reichenbach. The Journal 
of Philosophy 35 (10): 270-272. 
Nagel, E. (1939/1956). Dialectical Materialism in Science. In Logic without Metaphysics and 
Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 331-334.  
Nagel, E. (1940/1956). The Historian as a Moralist. In Logic without Metaphysics and Other 
Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press 383-388.  
Nagel, E. (1942). Review of Introduction to Semantics by Rudolf Carnap. Journal of 
Philosophy 39 (17): 468-473. 
Nagel, E. (1944/1956). Logic without Ontology. In Logic without Metaphysics and Other 
Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 93-102. 
Nagel, E. (1948/1956). On the Philosophical Battlefront. In Logic without Metaphysics and 
Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 393-400. 
Nagel, E. (1954/1956). Naturalism reconsidered. In Logic without Metaphysics and Other 
Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 3-18. 
Nagel, E. (1957). Morris R. Cohen in Retrospect. Journal of the History of Ideas 18 (4): 548-
551. 
Nagel, E. (1963). Carnap’s Theory of Induction. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Rudolf Carnap. The Library of Living Philosophers. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 785-
826. 
Nagel, E. (1978). Recollections of Hans Reichenbach. In M. Reichenbach and R. S. Cohen 
(eds.), Hans Reichenbach: Selected Writings 1909-1953. Volume I. Dordrecht: Reidel, 
42-45. 
Papineau, D. (2009). Naturalism. In E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2009 Edition). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/  
Pincock, C. (2017). Ernest Nagel’s Naturalism: A Microhistory of the American Reception of 
Logical Empiricism. In A. Preston (ed.), Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History. 
New York: Routledge, 160-174. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1970/1976). Homage to Rudolf Carnap. In The Ways of Paradox. Revised 
edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 40-43. 
Randall, J. H. (1944). Epilogue: The nature of naturalism. In Krikorian (1944): 354-382.  
Reichenbach, H. (1928). Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre. Berlin: de Gruyter.  
Reichenbach, H. (1929). Ziele und Wege der physikalischen Erkenntnis. In: Handbuch der 
Physik. Volume 4: Allgemeine Grundlagen der Physik. Berlin: Springer, 1-80. 
 28 
Reichenbach, H. (1932). Axiomatik der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Mathematische 
Zeitschrift 34 (4): 568-619. 
Reichenbach, H. (1935). Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre. Leyden: Sijthoff  
Reichenbach, H. (1936). Logistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of Its 
Problems. Journal of Philosophy 33: 141-160. 
Reichenbach, H. (1938). On Probability and Induction. Philosophy of Science 5 (1): 21-45. 
Reichenbach, H. (1939). Dewey's Theory of Science. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy 
of John Dewey. The Library of Living Philosophers. Evanston, Ill.: Open Court, 159–
192.  
Rosenfield, L. C. (1962). Portrait of a Philosopher: Morris R. Cohen in Life and Letters. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Reisch, G. (2005). How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes 
of Logic. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Suppes, P. (1994). Ernest Nagel 1901-1985. Biographical Memoirs, Volume 65. National 
Academy of Sciences. Washington, DC: National Academics Press. 
Tuboly, A. T. (forthcoming). To the Icy Slopes in the Melting Pot: Forging Logical 
Empiricisms in the Context of American Pragmatism. HOPOS: The Journal of the 
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. 
Uebel, T. (2007). Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle’s Protocol-Sentence 
Debate. Chicago: Open Court. 
Verhaegh, S. (2018). Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine’s 
Naturalism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Verhaegh, S. (2020). The American Reception of Logical Positivism: First Encounters (1929-
1932). HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy 
of Science 10 (1): 106-142. 
Verhaegh, S. (forthcoming-a). Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great 
Intellectual Migration. Part I: Rudolf Carnap. Journal for the History of Analytical 
Philosophy.  
Verhaegh, S. (forthcoming-b). Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great 
Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach. Journal for the History of Analytical 
Philosophy.  
Verhaegh, S. (ms.). Carnap and Quine: First Encounters (1932-1936).  
Weiss, P. (1931). Two-Valued Logic: Another Approach. Erkenntnis 2: 242-261. 
